Articles Posted in Defending the Case

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The Bill of Rights in the U.S. Constitution protects numerous rights against abuses and injustice in criminal cases. Most of these constitutional rights apply in New Jersey driving while intoxicated (DWI) cases, including the Fourth Amendment’s protection of people’s right to be free from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” Identifying violations of these rights is a major component of defending against DWI charges. Most DWI cases begin with a traffic stop, in which police pull a vehicle over on the road. Police must have a “reasonable suspicion” of some sort of wrongdoing for a traffic stop to be legal. Challenging the legality of a stop can lead to the exclusion of most or all of the state’s evidence and the dismissal of the case.

According to the Fourth Amendment, police must obtain a warrant before conducting a search or seizing a person or their property. That warrant must be supported by probable cause to believe that doing so will produce evidence of a crime or another offense. The U.S. Supreme Court has held, however, that police may briefly detain a person to investigate possible criminal activity when they do not have probable cause, if they have a “reasonable suspicion” of something unlawful. This type of stop is known as a “Terry stop,” after the Supreme Court’s decision in Terry v. Ohio in 1968.

The U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that traffic stops are “seizures” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, and they are therefore subject to the restrictions established by Terry. A 1984 Supreme Court decision, Berkemer v. McCarty, found that Terry applies to traffic stops for suspected traffic offenses, including DWI. It also held that people are entitled to the protections of the Fifth Amendment, including the rights described in Miranda v. Arizona, if they are taken into custody during a traffic stop.

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Anyone who watches cop shows on television knows the warning police must read to a suspect when they place them under arrest. Known as the “Miranda warning,” after the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1966 decision in Miranda v. Arizona, it is legally required before police may formally interrogate a suspect. The list of rights identified in the Miranda warning are commonly known as Miranda rights. Miranda is considered a landmark decision in criminal justice. Although New Jersey’s driving while intoxicated (DWI) statute classifies the offense as a motor vehicle offense, rather than a “crime,” Miranda still applies when police take a DWI suspect into custody.

The Miranda decision arose from a confession signed by a suspect after hours of police interrogation, during which time he was never advised of various constitutional rights. The Supreme Court held that the confession was inadmissible because the defendant did not give it voluntarily, but instead under duress from police officers. The court further stated that police must stop an interrogation once an individual has asserted certain rights. It directed police to advise people of their rights before or at the time they are arrested. From this, the Miranda warning was born. The court would later specifically rule that Miranda applies to DWI cases in Berkemer v. McCarty in 1984.

The first right identified in the Miranda warning—the right to remain silent—refers to the Fifth Amendment’s protection against self-incrimination during “custodial interrogation.” The important question to consider regarding how Miranda applies in New Jersey DWI cases involves the definition of “custody,” as well as the meaning of “silence.” The two are closely related, as the caselaw shows, and DWI cases present at least one specific complication of the idea of the right to remain silent. In New Jersey and many other states, DWI suspects are required by law to provide breath samples for chemical testing. Courts have generally held that this does not violate the Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination.

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The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protects the right against self-incrimination. The extent of this protection is not always clear, however, and the right to refuse to provide information to police has limits. In driving while intoxicated (DWI) investigations, suspects are often asked to provide breath samples for chemical testing. The evidence obtained from breath testing can provide the state with nearly all of the information it needs to bring a DWI charge. In New Jersey DWI cases, providing a breath sample is actually mandatory under the law. Is this the sort of self-incrimination covered by the Fifth Amendment? A long line of court decisions says that no, it is not, but understanding why may be helpful in understanding the rights a DWI defendant does have.

Under New Jersey law, a refusal to submit a breath sample for chemical testing, upon a request by police, is a motor vehicle offense punishable by a fine and a driver’s license suspension. New Jersey courts have imposed strict requirements for submitting to breath testing. Anything other than unambiguous agreement could constitute refusal. A 2007 decision from the New Jersey Appellate Division, State v. Spell, held that a DWI suspect has no right to request testing after they have already refused. In that case, the defendant claimed he was having chest pains and could not provide a breath sample, but he told an officer he was feeling better after a hour. He offered to submit a sample at that time, but the officer “declined because defendant had already refused.”

The Fifth Amendment states that “no person…shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.” This applies to sworn testimony in a court of law, which is where we get the term “pleading the Fifth.” It also protects the “right to remain silent” during custodial police interrogations, which generally means after a person has been placed under arrest and advised of their rights. In most situations, a person must affirmatively state that they are invoking their right against self-incrimination, or else police may continue questioning them.

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When police detain and question a person on suspicion of driving while intoxicated (DWI), the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution protect that person’s rights. The Fourteenth Amendment officially extended most of the Bill of Rights to state-level law enforcement, meaning that local police are subject to the same constraints as the federal government. In the context of New Jersey DWI cases, the Fourth Amendment states that police cannot detain someone, such as by pulling over their vehicle, without reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing. The Fifth Amendment states that a defendant cannot be forced to testify against themselves, and limits the state’s ability to use certain statements made by defendants against them in court. Exactly when this right against self-incrimination applies has been a matter of ongoing dispute in the courts. The U.S. Supreme Court has made several rulings specifically addressing incriminating statements in DWI cases.

The landmark U.S. Supreme Court case addressing the right against self-incrimination during police interrogation is Miranda v. Arizona, decided in 1966. Information obtained by police from a person, after they have invoked their “right to remain silent” during “custodial interrogation,” is inadmissible in court. While people can refuse to answer police questions at almost any time, Miranda obligates police to advise people of their rights in specific scenarios. Many subsequent court decisions have found that Miranda only applies once a person has been formally placed under arrest and read this list of rights. Whether a person is “under arrest” during a traffic stop is a complicated question.

Police do not typically give Miranda warnings to DWI suspects at the beginning of a traffic stop. Still, officers may ask questions of a driver, and ask the driver to perform field sobriety tests. With some exceptions, courts do not consider this to be a “custodial interrogation” within the meaning of Miranda. Police are therefore not obligated to advise people of their Miranda rights at this point, placing the burden of invoking the right against self-incrimination on the driver.
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New Jersey law regarding driving while intoxicated (DWI) imposes progressively harsher penalties for multiple convictions. A defendant might not face heightened penalties, however, through “step-down” provisions in New Jersey statutes and caselaw. If enough time passes between convictions, a second offense might be treated as a first offense for sentencing purposes. A step-down might also apply in other situations, such as if a prior conviction involved a guilty plea without representation by an attorney. Convictions that have been modified through the post-conviction relief (PCR) process may also be subject to a step-down. Courts must weigh a wide range of factors in determining how to sentence a second, third, or subsequent conviction. The Appellate Division took on several of these factors in a recent decision, State v. Terpstra.

The New Jersey DWI statute imposes increasingly harsh sentences for second DWI offenses and third or subsequent offenses. The statute directs courts to treat a second conviction as a first conviction, for the purposes of sentencing, if the first offense occurred over a decade before the second. Likewise, if a third offense occurs more than 10 years after the second, the court shall sentence it as a second offense. The relevant date is when the offenses occurred, rather than the convictions.

Representation by counsel in prior DWI cases may also affect whether the step-down provisions apply. In 1990, the New Jersey Supreme Court issued an important ruling, State v. Laurick. The court held that courts may not impose sentencing enhancements if a prior conviction involved a non-counseled guilty plea. In other words, a second DWI conviction must be treated as a first at sentencing if the defendant pleaded guilty in the first case without a lawyer. A third offense would be sentenced as a second.

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The legal standards in New Jersey for proving impairment by alcohol in cases of alleged driving while intoxicated (DWI) are fairly well established. Prosecutors can offer evidence of a defendant’s alleged blood alcohol content (BAC), or they can introduce eyewitness and expert testimony. The DWI statute does not only apply to alcohol, however. It also makes it an offense to drive while “under the influence of…[a] narcotic, hallucinogenic or habit-producing drug.” New Jersey has no equivalent to the BAC limit of 0.08 percent for drugs. A handful of states have established “legal limits” for certain drugs, but no consistent standards exist. Furthermore, breath testing cannot establish the amount of any particular drug in a person’s system, meaning that the state must rely on blood and urine testing. As legal marijuana becomes more prevalent in various parts of the country, these inconsistencies are likely to become clearer.

Under New Jersey law, a driver commits a DWI offense if they operate a vehicle with a BAC of at least 0.08 percent. This is sometimes known as DWI per se, since the state can meet its burden of proof based solely on BAC evidence and evidence that the defendant actually was driving or imminently intended to drive. Prosecutors can also establish guilt without BAC evidence—or occasionally with test results showing a BAC of less than 0.08 percent—through testimony and other evidence. This often includes testimony from police officers who observed a defendant’s demeanor and appearance, particularly if the defendant was driving erratically, had slurred speech, or otherwise displayed outward signs of intoxication by alcohol.

The DWI statute does not mention any specific drug other than alcohol, but courts have interpreted it to mean both illegal drugs and legal drugs that can affect a person’s ability to drive or operate machinery. They have held that eyewitness and expert testimony is sufficient to prove impairment by drugs. In 1975, the New Jersey Supreme Court held in State v. Tamburro that the state must offer evidence that a defendant’s “conduct, physical and mental condition and the symptoms displayed” are consistent with the effects of a narcotic. If the state meets this burden, the court held, it does not have to identify any specific narcotic. The court held in 2006’s State v. Bealor that, unlike in cases involving alcohol intoxication, lay testimony alone is not sufficient to establish impairment by marijuana or other drugs. Police officers with proper training, according to the court, may offer expert testimony.

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New Jersey law allows prosecutors to offer evidence of driving while intoxicated (DWI) in two ways. One way relies on evidence like testimony by police officers about outward signs of intoxication, including appearance and behavior. The second method involves evidence that a defendant’s blood alcohol content (BAC) was above a certain level. This is often known as “per se” DWI because the BAC evidence creates a presumption that the defendant was impaired by alcohol. A DWI defense strategy should take both methods of proving DWI into consideration. Defending against a per se DWI charge in New Jersey often involves challenging police equipment more than police witnesses. The Appellate Division recently considered an appeal of a per se DWI conviction in State v. Page.

The DWI statute defines the offense as driving either “while under the the influence” of alcohol or drugs or with a BAC of at least 0.08 percent. The latter definition constitutes per se DWI. It does not necessarily require any evidence other than the defendant’s actual or imminent operation of a motor vehicle and the defendant’s BAC at or near that time. It is possible to obtain an acquittal or dismissal in a DWI case even with evidence of a BAC over 0.08 percent. It is also possible, however, for the state to obtain a conviction without BAC evidence or with a BAC of less than 0.08 percent.

New Jersey courts have established a variety of procedures and protocols that police must follow in an effort to ensure the accuracy of BAC test results. Police in this state commonly use a device known as the Alcotest to measure BAC. The defendant must provide a breath sample by blowing into a tube. The device then measures the alcohol content of the sample. The Alcotest requires regular maintenance and careful calibration, and it can produce inaccurate results without either of these. A 2008 decision by the New Jersey Supreme Court, State v. Chun, establishes maintenance and record-keeping protocols that police must follow for Alcotest results to be admissible in court. It also requires police to observe a DWI suspect for 20 minutes before administering the test.

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Under New Jersey’s driving while intoxicated (DWI) statute, a defendant is presumed to be legally impaired by alcohol if their blood alcohol content (BAC) is 0.08 percent or higher. Police in New Jersey commonly use a device known as the Alcotest to collect breath samples, which the device analyzes to measure BAC. Police may also obtain blood or urine samples to test, but state law only requires drivers to submit breath samples in DWI investigations. Obtaining a sample of blood usually requires a warrant or the person’s consent. Determining whether a defendant gave proper consent to a warrantless blood draw is a key question courts must consider. The New Jersey Appellate Division ruled on this issue earlier this year in State v. Milkosky.

The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution requires police to obtain a warrant before searching a person or their property. Drawing blood for use in a police investigation counts as a “search.” Courts have identified multiple exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. The “exigent circumstances” exception applies when police and prosecutors can demonstrate that taking the time to get a warrant from a judge would result in greater harm than the warrantless search, such as the destruction of evidence, the escape of a suspect, or harm to an officer or others.

Police have, at times, claimed exigent circumstances to justify collecting blood samples from a DWI suspect without a warrant or the suspect’s consent. Alcohol breaks down in the human body due to the process of metabolism. In 2013, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the claim that the metabolism of alcohol in the body, by itself, satisfies the exigent circumstances exception. The decision, Missouri v. McNeely, established that a warrant or the suspect’s consent is required for most blood draws.

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The legal treatment of driving while intoxicated (DWI) varies from one state to another, with some states categorizing it as a criminal offense and others, including New Jersey, calling it a traffic or motor vehicle offense. Several recent media reports have questioned whether New Jersey’s DWI laws are “tough enough,” pointing to the risks allegedly posed by repeat offenders. The New Jersey Legislature has revised and amended the DWI statute many times, and several bills are currently pending that would increase some penalties and reduce others. A key question to consider when discussing the “toughness” of DWI laws is whether the purpose of these laws is to punish people who violate the law, prevent people from violating the law in the future, or some combination of the two. This particular dispute is at least as old as the legal system itself.

Every state defines DWI, in part, as driving with blood alcohol content (BAC) of 0.08 percent or higher. The differences between treating DWI as a criminal or traffic offense include the procedures courts must follow at trial, and the possible punishments resulting from a conviction. A DWI conviction in New Jersey, by itself, results in license suspension and a fine, as well as the possibility of jail time. A first-time offender with BAC of at least 0.15 percent must also install an ignition interlock device (IID) in their vehicle, both during and after the period of suspension. Second, third, and subsequent offenses also carry greater possible penalties, up to a maximum fine of $1,000, license suspension of ten years, and 180 days in jail.

In states where DWI is considered a criminal offense, penalties may be greater than in New Jersey, in terms of fine amount and length of jail sentence. The specific code section dealing with DWI in New Jersey, however, is not the only one involved in DWI enforcement. The New Jersey Motor Vehicle Code includes provisions penalizing drivers for refusing to submit to breath testing and for driving with a suspended license, as well as for circumstances like DWI with a minor passenger in the vehicle.
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New Jersey law imposes increasingly harsh penalties for subsequent convictions of driving while intoxicated (DWI) and refusal to submit to breath testing. Penalties for both offenses may include fines, a driver’s license suspension, and the mandatory use of an ignition interlock device. A conviction for DWI may also involve jail time. State law includes “step-down” provisions, however, that lessen the severity of a sentence if a sufficient amount of time has passed since the most recent prior conviction. The New Jersey Appellate Division recently ruled on an appeal involving a defendant’s refusal conviction, which followed three DWI convictions. The court’s ruling in State v. Clapper considered whether the step-down provisions, which only mention second and third DWI offenses, apply to subsequent refusal offenses.

The New Jersey DWI statute imposes progressively harsher penalties for (1) a first DWI conviction involving a blood alcohol content (BAC) of at least 0.08 percent but less than 0.10 percent, (2) a first offense involving a BAC of 0.10 percent or higher, (3) a second offense, and (4) a third or subsequent offense. The refusal statute imposes increasing penalties for (1) first, (2) second, and (3) third or subsequent offenses. Prior DWI convictions may be used to enhance the sentence for a refusal conviction, according to the Appellate Division’s 2015 ruling in State v. Taylor, but prior refusal convictions may not be used to enhance a DWI conviction.

Under the step-down provisions, if a second DWI offense occurs more than 10 years after the first, the court must impose the sentence for a first offense. Likewise, if a third offense occurs more than 10 years after the second, the court must treat it as a second offense. This applies to both DWI and refusal convictions under the system described in Taylor. Notably, the step-down provisions do not mention subsequent convictions after a third one.

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